Pedagogika, 2015, 65(5), 459–470
http://pages.pedf.cuni.cz/

Naturalistic, Romantic, Liberal: Philosophical Tenets of Modern Pedagogy in the Context of Postmodern Critique

Jan Hábl

Abstract: *The goal of this study is to sketch three main philosophical tenets or metanarratives of the so-called period of modernity in order to show their implications for the educational leading of a child in the western world (primarily in Central Europe).*

Each subchapter will outline one metanarrative or tenet of modernity and show its implication for pedagogy. The tenets are as follows: first, the naturalistic metanarrative which promoted the hegemony of science and offered technological control of the physical world; second, the romantic metanarrative of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual sensibility that gives life subjective meaning and purpose, regardless of objective reality, and third, the liberal metanarrative of freedom and tolerance through which cultural diversity is governed and policed. We will see that the naturalistic and romantic notions of the search for secure knowledge brought about tensions calling for resolution. The liberal imperative offered an effective solution. It established a philosophical framework within which the two could live together in relative harmony despite the significant differences between them.

The analysis of the three metanarratives will enable the reader: 1. to see how schools have played an essential role in implementing the agenda of modernity; 2. to understand the specific challenge contemporary pedagogy faces as a result of the crisis of the modern paradigm that the Western world has encountered for several decades. The postmodern school 'clientele' – the child or student – does not share the modern metanarrative. In fact, the postmodern person does not believe in any metanarrative any more.

The key question this study intends to raise is – and not just for theorists of education – whether it is possible (in the long term) to maintain any school or society composed of individuals who do not share any unifying metanarrative. By raising this question the study suggests that one of the key tasks of contemporary pedagogy is to seek a metanarrative framework that would be admissible both to educators and to contemporary postmodern children or students, and thus make education legitimate and meaningful.

Keywords: *education, pedagogy, post/modernity, metanarratives, philosophy.*

Modern pedagogical traditions are historically situated in the time of the rise of so-called modernity. It is impossible to talk about modernity without reference to the rich philosophical legacy of the Enlightenment. The goal of this study is

to sketch three main philosophical tenets or metanarratives of this period in order to show their implications for pedagogy.[1] Each subchapter will outline one metanarrative or tenet and show its implication for pedagogy. The tenets are as follows: first, the naturalistic metanarrative which promoted the hegemony of science and offered technological control of the physical world; second, the romantic metanarrative of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual sensibility that gives life subjective meaning and purpose, regardless of objective reality, and third, the liberal metanarrative of freedom and tolerance through which cultural diversity is governed and policed. We will see that the naturalistic and romantic notions of the search for secure knowledge brought about tensions calling for resolution. The liberal imperative offered an effective solution. It established a philosophical framework within which the two could live together in relative harmony despite the significant differences between them. We will also see how schools and education in general were shaped by these metanarratives. The sub-goal of this study is to outline the key reasons for the feeling of crisis in both modernity and modern pedagogy in so-called Western Civilization.[2] We will see that the postmodern school 'clientele' – the children or students – do not share the modern metanarrative, which brings about a specific challenge to contemporary educators.

Three metanarratives of modernity

The essence of the project of modernity could be condensed into the following words: *an autonomous and rational attempt to discover, describe, and explain the natural order of things*.[3] In contrast to the medieval tradition of blind obedience to authority, the Enlightenment thinkers wanted to regain the freedom of critical and autonomous reasoning, hence the motto *sapere aude*. The Enlightenment understood itself as the coming of age of humanity, as the moment in history when people finally summoned up the courage to liberate themselves from the chains of ignorance and superstition by means of autonomous reason.[4] The modern optimism was great indeed. Wright (2004, p. 12) summarised the beliefs of the mo-

[1] In this work I am not going to deal with the question of the date of modernity. It is certain that there were different historical events that contributed to the evolution of modernity, but it is hard to set a clear date for its beginning. Different authors propose different events and dates, such as Gutenberg's invention of the printing press in 1436 or Luther's rebellion against the authority of the Church in 1520, or the end of the Thirty Years' War in 1648, etc. For a good elaboration of this problem see Toulmin (1990) pp. 5-8.

[2] In this paper I will focus primarily on developments in the Central European countries which historically belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. On the problem of the crisis of the modern paradigm see, for example, Van Doren (1991), Erickson (2001), Greer & Lewis (2005), Murphy & McClendon (1989), Murphy (1996), Grenz (1996), and Veith (1994). For a very good account of the transformation of culture from modernity to postmodernity in the area of literature see also Ruland (1991).

[3] That is where Wright (2004, p. 1, 10ff) began his account of the legacy of modernity.

[4] Toulmin (1990, p. 176) and others speak about the "religion of rationality". See also Schaeffer (1980, p. 65ff).

dern thinkers as follows: "…we need no longer accept a slavish dependence on external authority; that we can trust our own experiences, judgements and reason; that we can discover for ourselves the ultimate meaning and purpose of life, we are ourselves the true measure of reality and source of order in the world; that, perhaps, for the first time in history, we can start to tell authentic stories about ourselves and our place in the ultimate order-of-things."

The optimistic belief in human autonomous potential resulted, according to Wright, in the emergence of three interrelated metanarratives,[5] which together constitute the essence of modernity:

1. The naturalistic metanarrative of the hegemony of science offers technological control of the physical world. The naturalistic notion of the world is underlined by an epistemological assumption that human beings can distance themselves from the world with impunity. The newfound "omnipotence" of human reason encourages the search for establishing secure and certain knowledge as a means of reconnecting the mind with the natural order of things. Such an endeavour obviously presupposes a realist theory of truth predicated on the correspondence of ideas contained within the mind and external reality. Wright (2004, p. 16) pointed out that this distinction between the internal operations of the mind and the external reality of the material world has its modern roots in Descartes' identification of the 'mental' and 'physical' as the two basic substances, or building blocks of the universe. The role of language in this view is to establish a bridge between the mental and physical by accurately representing the facts of the natural world in the mirror of the mind. The role of our five senses is essential – they constitute the basis of all knowledge. By describing our empirical experience in an ordered, systematic, and scientific way, we are able to establish certain knowledge of the natural world. Millard J. Erickson (2001) observed that this optimism is based on the assumption that the structure of reality is rational:

It follows an orderly pattern. The same logical structure of the external world is also found in the human mind, thus enabling the human to know and organise that world. In most cases, this order or pattern is believed to be immanent within the world, rather than deriving from some transcendent source (p. 74).

Stephen Toulmin (1990) described this shift in thinking as the "politics of certainty", and reminded us of the sociopolitical dimension of the phenomena. The desire for certain knowledge was not a mere intellectual and detached exercise on the part of some academics, but rather "a timely response to a specific historical challenge: the political, social and theological chaos embodied in the Thirty Years' War" (p. 71).

[5] The term 'metanarrative' is borrowed from Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984). He identifies metanarratives as grand stories of society explaining all reality, thus legitimising themselves. The postmodern period is characterised, according to Lyotard, by an incredulity about metanarratives, which is, in fact, Lyotard's definition of postmodernism (p. 23ff).

Modern thinkers, however, were never totally blind to Descartes' concerns about the reliability of our senses. While David Hume represented the sceptical strand of empirical philosophy, logical positivists stood at the other end of the philosophical spectrum. They sought to overcome Hume's scepticism by invoking the principle of verification, which demanded that all truth claims be tested against empirical experience. Wright (2004) inferred that "this effectively reduces all moral, aesthetic and religious discourse to the level of emotive utterances incapable of engaging cognitively with the real world; it is not possible to verify on the basis of sense experience whether a person is good, a sunset beautiful, or God holy, since we can neither see, smell, taste, touch or hear goodness, beauty or holiness" (p. 17).

The main effects of elevating the narrative of naturalism to the position of being the ultimate and exclusive metanarrative of modernity are, according to Wright (2004), twofold: "reality is reduced to the value-free deterministic play of cause and effect in the physical world, and the natural scientist is appointed as arbiter, mediator and high priest of ultimate truth" (p. 18).

2. The second is the romantic metanarrative of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual sensibility that gives life meaning and purpose. Wright observed from the outset that modernity engendered an alternative metanarrative which claimed that human beings encounter truth not in the natural world, but in the idealistic realm of the thoughts, ideas, and experiences we carry around in our heads independently of any sensory experience. According to idealism, our understanding of the order of things is not rooted in sense experience, but rather in the mental ideas, pictures, and constructions of reality present in our minds. Francis A. Schaeffer (1994) observed that this romantic response was motivated by the increasing pressure of naturalistic determinism: "as man (sic) begins to feel the weight of the machine pressing upon him (sic), Rousseau and others swear and curse, as it were, against the science which threatens their human freedom" (p. 228).[6]

Instead of correspondence theory, the romantic attempt to grasp the order of things requires merely a *coherence* theory of truth. In this, according to Wright (2004), the veracity of our comprehension of reality is judged in terms of its inherent clarity, connectedness, and cohesiveness. The task of language is "not to build a bridge between the mind and the external world, but rather to give coherent expression to our inner thoughts, experiences and intuitions" (p. 19).

Although the classic examples of modern idealism can be found in the all-embracing philosophical systems developed by Spinoza, Leibniz, and Hegel, the embryonic version of romanticism can be

[6] However, it should be noted that the mechanistic notion of humans and nature has not been viewed negatively. Charles Van Doren (1991, pp. 214-216) quotes Adam Smith (1723–1790), who marvelled at the wondrous coupling of the human and non-human parts of factory machines, and saw this as a potential source of "universal opulence" for the world.

traced as far back as to Immanuel Kant. Kant's distinction between 'phenomena' and 'noumena,' that is, between things as-they-appear-to-me and things as-they--are-in-themselves, led to a crucial shift in philosophical discourse. According to Kant, human understanding of reality is dependent on the innate structures of the mind, those pre-established categories of understanding through which we view reality. Consequently, we only have access to the phenomenological world of appearances, but never the noumenal world of things as they are in themselves. "Following Kant," commented Wright (2004), "I can no longer say 'This is the case', only that 'It appears to me that this is the case.' Kant thus unwittingly gave birth to a distinctively modern mode of expression: 'From my point of view…,' 'The way I see it…,' 'In my opinion….'" (p. 19).

Thus Romanticism, when coupled with Descartes' insistence on the primacy of reflective self-consciousness, gives one freedom to read the world in one's own terms, through one's own personal frame of reference. "Nobody has the right to tell me that my experience is illegitimate, my reasoning incorrect, or my emotions misdirected. Hence the truth of my value system lies not in its connection with any external order, nor in any objective or ontological foundation, but simply in the fact that I have an emotional commitment to it" (p. 20).

3. The third is the liberal metanarrative of freedom and tolerance through which cultural diversity is governed and policed. The naturalistic and romantic notions of the search for secure knowledge, though potentially complementary, brought about tensions calling for resolution. "In attempting to reconcile the realms of fact and value," said Wright, "modernity forged a third, unifying metanarrative: liberalism, which sought to mediate between naturalism and romanticism by establishing a framework within which they could learn to live together in relative harmony *despite* their significant differences" (p. 21). The resulting liberal polity was built on the twin principles of freedom of belief and tolerance of the beliefs of others.

The roots of liberalism may be traced back to John Locke,[7] who was quick to recognise the practical limitations of naturalism. In affirming the vital significance of our beliefs, Locke made no attempt to deny their subjective nature: "the limits of human knowledge are so narrow and the probability of error on speculative matters so great that we can never know for certain that our religious opinions are correct and all others false and heretical," says Wright (2004, p. 21). This led Locke to affirm the principle of freedom in all matters that could not be shown to constitute indisputable and irrefutable factual knowledge.

[7] Greer & Lewis (2005) identify the origin of the liberal metanarrative with even earlier thinkers, such as Erasmus and Rabelais. Similarly to Wright, they affirm that "central to the thinking of these men was their stress on human personality and its free development. This idea could be realised, they believed, only through each individual's exercise of personal freedom".

In time this liberal strategy satisfied both camps: the Naturalists could hold fast to their secure results of scientific enterprise, and the Romantics could, without any disturbance, enjoy the authenticity of their subjective moral, aesthetic, and spiritual experiences. The cost of liberal practice was not particularly high. The only demand was to follow the tolerance imperative: if I assert my freedom to believe whatever I like, then I must be willing to respect the freedom of others to do likewise.

Wright (2004) further observed that this narrative, originally intended as heuristic, gradually transformed into a narrowly dogmatic worldview. As the liberal principles came to be seen as ends in themselves, their observance began to be rigorously policed and enforced. Thus the Enlightenment ideal of individuals having the courage to think for themselves is here recast as the liberal ideal of "individuals thinking for themselves within the confines and constraints of non-negotiable liberal order" (p. 22).

"The final outcome of the project of modernity," concluded Wright (2004), "is the hegemony of a closed world of liberal values rooted in a liberal meta-narrative that functions to paper over the dualistic tensions between the meta-narratives of naturalism and romanticism" (p. 22).

The account of modern thought could be presented in a number of different ways equally valid to this threefold exposition. Nancey Murphy and James W. McClendon Jr., for example (Hauerwas, Murphy & Nation, Eds., 1994), though using different categorising terminology, overlapped fairly well with Wright's account by identifying three significant doctrines forming the basis of modern thought: foundationalism in epistemology,[8] an approach to language based on reference and representation, and atomism or individualism in metaphysics and ethics. They mapped these onto a conceptual space defined by three (Cartesian) axes: an epistemological axis, with scepticism and foundationalism as its poles, a linguistic axis, with representationalism and expressivism as its poles, and an individualist-collectivist axis.[9]

Implications for the education of children

Such was the philosophical context in which the shift from a medieval model of pedagogy to the modern one took place. From a pedagogical point of view, the main vice of the model of education had traditionally been a blind reliance on external authorities. Didactically, this meant the rigidly formal character of the

[8] Murphy defines foundationalism elsewhere as: "a theory about how claims to know can be justified. When we seek to justify a belief, we do so by relating it to (basing it upon, deriving it from) other beliefs. If these other beliefs are called into question, they too must be justified. Foundationalists insist that this chain of justifications must stop somewhere. It must not be circular nor must it constitute an infinite regress. Thus, the regress must end in a 'foundation' of beliefs that cannot themselves be called into question" (p. 7).

[9] For other options see also Grenz & Franke (2001), or Clark (1990).

teaching processes relying solely on the method of verbal transmission of fixed knowledge.[10] The child was seen primarily as an object of education, a receptive vessel awaiting fulfilment with facts and information. Another problem of traditional pedagogy closely related to this was that of indoctrination, which might be described as an "authoritative exposition to only one way of viewing reality," according to Elmer J. Thiessen (1993). He identified the authoritativeness in those teaching processes that "violate the principles of rationality, critical openness, freedom, and respect to persons" (p. 3). With the expansion of the Enlightenment maxims, such an approach to education gradually became less and less acceptable. We have seen above that the main goal of Enlightenment human intellectual endeavour was to unravel the mystery of the world and life without reference to any external authority. The intention was to take control of nature, form prosperous life conditions, and create a better world. Since the world was assumed to be just a big cosmic machine which functioned on the basis of certain physical, mathematical, biological, etc. regularities, it was thought that as soon as people (scientists) managed to explore the mechanism, they would gain power over it. With the expansion of natural science, faith in its omnipotence and its inevitable progress for humankind also grew. One of the key assumptions behind this optimism was that human nature is essentially good. Jean J. Rousseau, for example, put it plainly: "the first impulses of nature are always right; there is no original sin in the human heart."[11] Such a conviction raises a question, however: if the human being is essentially good, how can we explain the overwhelming empirical data concerning human evil? Why do people do evil things? Douglas Wilson (2003) pointed out that "the answer given to this dilemma goes back at least to Socrates. If man (sic) is basically good, then he (sic) must do evil things because of ignorance. Therefore, the saviour for ignorant man (sic) must be education. The antidote to ignorance is teaching" (p. 45).

Hence the new task of pedagogy was to provide the child with knowledge of all the new scientific facts, natural laws, and regularities. This new encyclopaedic kind of knowledge was supposed to become the vehicle that would bring humankind to the coveted optimistic goal. According to Skalková (1999, p. 34), at the end of the eighteenth century there evolved the so-called *theory of pedagogic naturalism* (or *realism*). The progress of natural discoveries was so rapid, and the amount of new information about reality so vast, that the creators of the school curricula could not ignore it. Although it was a slow process, gradually the natural sciences found their way into the pedagogic curricula, and pupils were to become small walking encyclopaedias.

[10] Skalková (1999, p. 34) further observes the fact that in terms of subject matter the pupils first had to learn Latin and Greek, which enabled them later to read the classical philosophical and theological literature. The emphasis, however, was laid on the formal part of the study, where the content of classical texts was only secondary.
[11] Taken from Wright (2004, p. 127).

The humanistic accents of the Enlightenment inherited from the Renaissance resulted in a pedagogical theory called *the theory of pedagogic neo-humanism*, which appeared on the scene simultaneously with the previous theory. The neo-humanists believed that besides the natural sciences it was also important to form a child's character through the Graeco-Roman ideals of goodness, beauty, truth, harmony, etc. Greek culture and erudition, in particular, were considered to be an ideal of humanity that should be pursued. The famous Greek term *kalokagathia* was rediscovered as the goal of all training. It described the ideal of versatility and harmonically developed individuality.[12] The crucial elements of education, according to the neo-humanists, were the study of classical texts (in the original) and the development of the personality of the pupil. The goal of such an education was not to prepare the child for his or her (more often *his* at that time) future occupation or practical life, but to refine, cultivate, and develop his character. Such perfecting of the inner potential was supposed to lead to the development of the ideal autonomous humanity.[13]

It is important not to overlook the significant shift that took place here in relation to the goal(s) of education. The ideal of a well-educated and well-formed human character was no longer determined by external authorities as it had been in the pre-modern God-centred era. The Renaissance (and subsequently modern) return to the Graeco-Roman ideal of humanity was a *de-God-ing*[14] or secularising shift towards a human-centred understanding of humanity.[15] It was humanity itself that determined its own ideals and goals, for it "established itself as the measure of reality and took responsibility for its own destiny," as Wright (2004, p. 127) put it.

As a consequence of the above-mentioned tendencies, a new pedagogical notion began to be elaborated at the beginning of the nineteenth century in terms of the curriculum. In contrast to the so-called *elementary* curriculum that was available to the lower social classes, there developed a concept of a *general* curriculum that was provided for the children in the Gymnasium type of school. Three tendencies might be observed in this curricular shift: 1. the tendency to include all contemporary knowledge into the curriculum began a (still unresolved) struggle for the balance between natural and humanistic subjects. In other words, the question is what exactly the child needs to know to be truly human; 2. this led to encyclopaedism in education, which is another much-discussed problem today: how much does the child need to know to be truly human? 3. the goal of education gradually changed – the original intention to cultivate one's char-

[12] It is derived from two Greek words: *kalos* and *agathos*, meaning beautiful and good.
[13] The emphasis on the Graeco-Roman ideal is easily observable in the school curriculum—even as late as 1849 the study of Greek and Latin represented 40% of the whole amount of time.
[14] This term is borrowed from D. A. Carson (2005).
[15] For a detailed outline of the phenomena of secularisation see Berger (1967).

acter according to the neo-humanistic agenda was replaced by a more pragmatic goal, namely to equip the child with practical facts and skills useful for everyday life: what is the ultimate goal of education, and thus of humanity?

Modernity and its education from the postmodern perspective: Crisis

The school has had an irreplaceable role within the modern paradigm, as the key means of sharing the modern metanarratives. All the teaching tools, knowledge, facts, skills, and values that it had at its disposal and which it grew, developed, and passed on had their significance directly in the process of implementing the modern agenda. The ultimate goal of all educational efforts was said to be to "prepare children for life" – which, deconstructed with post-modern hermeneutics, means to mould them to be able to accept and play well their socially determined role in the modern scenario. That it often also included more or less latent indoctrination follows from the very nature of the narrative. But the fact remains that it was a very functional indoctrination. For centuries it effectively produced and strengthened an almost religious belief in progress. In addition to the overarching metanarratives, the school and academy belonged among the "sacred" things, for it was the key place in which the values of social integration were developed and used. The dignity of the teachers' robes, then, lay in the inheritance of historical continuity, inasmuch as the modern school, however demarcated it was from the pre-modern school, nevertheless continued in the same tradition. It was that of a persistent and deliberate search for, preservation, and transmission of truths which in their diversity were folded into one great unified whole – as indicated in the very notion of *university.*

The postmodern end of trust in the modern metanarrative meant the end of the school's greatest asset. Figuratively speaking, it lost its soul. Along with the great story it lost what legitimised its formative-educational role in society. The postmodern "client" is not expecting major objective (world-) views, definitive statements, or universal values from the school, let alone some educational "manufacturing" in the name of universal truth. All the children/clients want and need is the practical usefulness of the educational products. Do not educate us to be who you think we should be; just give us the facts, skills, and competencies, and we'll do with them what we want. We just need to be fit for the job market.[16] The school is thus reduced to being the servant or assistant of the child's individual self-advancement. In the postmodern climate the school has become the depository where the client goes to make an eclectic

[16] In this context the client is usually a university student, but in the case of younger children the clients are often the parents.

selection from a broad assortment of more or less key products suitable for her pragmatic needs. It is a very specific situation in which two philosophical worlds meet, mingle, and clash. The school is modern, but its clientele is postmodern. As a product of another era it appears to the postmodern person (whether a young child or a student) as something strange, authoritarian, intolerant, non-user-friendly, even user-hostile.[17]

But that is not all. In addition to the loss of its educative-formative legitimacy, the modern school must also face another challenge. A new player has entered the game, one who has been only too willing to take over the space vacated by the lost metanarratives: the mass media. Sociologists speak about the current structure of society as a "media-cracy" in which Descartes' "I think, therefore I am" no longer applies, but rather "I am in media, therefore I am."[18] The rules of the game have completely changed. The most valuable commodity of the media is the attention of the public. The immediate harvest is popularity. Anyone who joins the media game must play according to its rules, which in no way favour the intellectual activities that in the past brought the school its majesty. The great pains taken in the formation of character, the cultivation of qualitative values, and a basic regard for truth are all activities that are too slow and tedious for the media. They are not visually attractive, and therefore it is unlikely that they would gain the public's interest in the first place, let alone keep it. From the moment the media took over that space left by the metanarrative, educators have had to compete for the child's attention with celebrities, perverts, terrorists, bank robbers, pandemics, virtual reality, 3D attractions, and other offerings of the media. In such competition educators have no chance of winning.[19] Hence the feeling of crisis in modern education.

Conclusion

We have seen three foundational metanarratives on which modern thinking was built. The first was the naturalistic metanarrative which promoted the hegemony of science and offered technological control of the physical world. The second was the romantic metanarrative of moral, aesthetic, and spiritual sensibility that gives life subjective meaning and purpose, regardless of objective reality. The third was the liberal metanarrative of freedom and tolerance through which cultural diversity was governed and policed. The naturalistic and the romantic notions of the search for secure knowledge brought about tensions calling for resolution. The liberal imperative offered an effective solution. It established a philosophical framework within which they could learn to live together in relative harmony despite their significant differences. Schools played an essential role in implementing the modern

[17] The current situation is aptly designated by R. Palouš (2007), where he discusses the so-called "post-educative period".
[18] For more on this see the classic bestseller of Neil Postman (1986).
[19] Compare Bauman (2004, p. 158ff).

agenda. However, the crisis of the modern paradigm that the Western world has encountered for several decades presents the modern school and pedagogy with a specific challenge. The child was understood as becoming properly human by: 1. acquiring (natural) facts and knowledge; 2. determining her own subjective meaning – not necessarily dependent on objective facts, but rather on the subjective self, and 3. embracing the imperative of freedom; that is, everyone must be granted a freedom of self-determination.

The postmodern school 'clientele' does not share the modern metanarrative. In fact, the postmodern person does not believe in any metanarrative. The question is – and not just for theorists of education – whether it is possible (in the long term) to maintain any school or society composed of individuals who do not share any unifying metanarrative. The objective of this study is to raise this question and by doing this suggest that one of the key tasks of contemporary pedagogy is to seek such a metanarrative framework that would be admissible both to educators and to contemporary postmodern children or students, and thus make education legitimate and meaningful.

References

Bauman, Z. (2004). *Individualizovaná společnost [Individualized society]*. (M. Ritter, Trans.). Praha: Mladá fronta.

Berger, P. L. (1967). *The sacred canopy: elements of sociological theory of religion.* Garden City: Doubleday.

Carson, D. A. (2005). *That first temptation: sin and the fall*. Delivered at the European Leadership Forum, Sopron, Hungary, June 1, 2005.

Clark, K. J. (1990). *Return to reason*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Erickson, M. J. (2001). *Truth or consequences: the promise and perils of postmodernism*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.

Greer, T. H., & Lewis, G. (2005). *A brief history of the Western world*. Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth.

Grenz, S. J. (1996). *A primer on postmodernism*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.

Grenz, S. J., & Franke, J. R. (2001). *Beyond foundationalism, shaping theology in a postmodern context*. Westminster: John Knox Press.

Hauerwas. S., Murphy, N., & Nation, M. (Eds.). (1994). *Theology without foundations: religious practice and the future of theological truth*. Nashville: Abingdon Press.

Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). *The postmodern condition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Murphy, N. (1996). *Beyond liberalism and fundamentalism: how modern and postmodern philosophy set the theological agenda*. Bloomsbury T&T Clark.

Murphy, N., & McClendon, J. W. (1989) Distinguishing modern and postmodern theologies. *Modern Theology*, *5*(3), 191-213.

Palouš, R. (2007). Doba postedukační? [Post-education Period?]. In *Rozhovory, které pokračují [Continuing discussions]*. Praha: Eurolex Bohemia.

Postman, N. (1986). *Amusing ourselves to death: public discourse in the age of show business.* New York City: Penguin Books.
Ruland, R., & Bredbury, M. (1991). *From puritanism to postmodernism: a history of American literature*. New York: Viking Penguin.
Schaeffer, F. A. (1980). *How should we then live? The rise and decline of Western thought and culture.* London: Marshall Morgan & Scott (1st edition published 1976).
Skalková, J. (1999). *Obecná didaktika [General didactics]*. Praha: ISV.
Thiessen, E. J. (1993). *Teaching for commitment, liberal education, indoctrination and Christian nurture*. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.
Toulmin, S. (1990). *Cosmopolis, the hidden agenda of modernity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Van Doren, C. A. (1991). *History of knowledge*. New York: Random House Publishing Group.
Veith, G. E. (1994). *Postmodern times: a Christian guide to contemporary thought and culture*. Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway.
Wilson, D. (2003). *The case for classical Christian education*. Wheaton: Crossway Books.
Wright, A. (2004). *Religion, education and post-modernity*. London: RoutledgeFalmer.

PhDr. Jan Hábl, Ph.D.,
Jan Evangelista Purkyně University in Ústí nad Labem, Faculty of Education, Department of Pedagogy, Czech Republic; e-mail: jan.habl@ujep.cz